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ABSTRACT
We examine the role of fringe benefits in the firm’s choice between layoÆs and work-
sharing. We find that when labor markets are characterized by forward-looking
implicit contracts, the equilibrium contract will never call for layoÆs, regardless of
the level of fringe benefits.
1I. Introduction
Worksharing—the practice of reducing hours for all employees to avoid layoÆs for some
during downturns—is still very rare in the United States by comparison to Western Europe.
Yet well-known arguments due to Mortensen (1978) and Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) suggest
that, in the absence of complicating factors, an optimal implicit labor contract will always
call for worksharing, and never call for layoÆs. Three of these complicating factors are
commonly cited as the principal explanations for layoÆs in the United States. They are:
(1) the presence of tax distortions in the US unemployment insurance system which tend
to create a “layoÆ subsidy,” (2) an hours-elasticity in production that typically exceeds the
employment-elasticity, allowing firms greater savings through layoÆs during downturns, and
(3) the savings firms can achieve during downturns on fringe benefits and other fixed costs
of employment by the use of layoÆs.
The first two pillars of this conventional wisdom have been carefully and rigorously in-
vestigated. Support for the first can be found in Burdett and Wright (1989) and in Feldstein
(1976). Some empirical support for the second can also be found in Feldstein (1967). How-
ever, the role of fringe benefits in discouraging worksharing and encouraging the use of layoÆs
has so far escaped careful scrutiny. Instead, it owes its continued life in the literature to a
series of assertions and conjectures, such as those to be found in Bednarzik (1980), Best and
Mattesich (1980), Best (1978), Clark (1977) and Baily (1976), among others.
In this note we demonstrate that when the labor market is characterized by forward-
looking implicit contracts, fringe benefits are a wholly invalid explanation for the prevalence
of layoÆs. Our findings thus refute an important lingering part of the conventional wisdom
on layoÆs and serve to extend the results of Burdett and Wright (1989), Mortensen (1978),
and Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980).
In Section II we construct a simple but general model of equilibrium in the labor market
where firms oÆer workers implicit employment contracts which may specify either layoÆs or
worksharing, or both, during downturns. Then we demonstrate that the optimal contract
will call for worksharing—and never call for layoÆs—regardless of the level of fringe benefits.
Section III oÆers some concluding remarks.
2II. Market Equilibrium
Consider a set of firms producing a perishable good. Since our results do not depend on
any particular structure to competition in the product market, the set of firms concerned may
be thought of quite broadly to encompass anything from monopoly to perfect competition.
We let both demand and supply conditions be state dependent, and states x may have any
distribution function, F (x). Firm output in state x is produced from labor according to
the production function f(hxLx, x), where Lx is the number of employees and hx is normal
hours per employee.1 Workers join a firm’s labor pool before the state of the world is known,
and cannot move to another firm ex post. The normal pool of workers available to the firm
is bounded above, and we choose units so that 0 ∑ Lx ∑ 1. Thus, Lx can be interpreted
as the share of the firm’s labor pool which it employs in state x. In what follows, we will
assume that when firms resort to layoÆs, those laid oÆ are chosen by random draw. From
the worker’s point of view, then, Lx can also be interpreted as the probability that he or she
will be employed in state x.
Each firm oÆers an implicit contract to its workers which specifies, for each state x, the
probability of employment Lx, normal hours hx, and the wage rate wx, together with any
severance pay bx, and the cash equivalent of any fringe benefits c.2
Facing a contract which specifies the terms {Lx, hx, wx, bx, c}, firm profits in state x will
be
º(x) ¥ pxf (hxLx, x)° hxLxwx ° (1° Lx) bx ° cLx, (1)
where the px is the market price of firm output.
1The assumption that output depends only on one factor is not critical to our findings, and is only made
for simplicity. We also make the standard assumption of equal hours and employment elasticities of output.
This can be relaxed, slightly, to correspond with Burdett and Wright’s (1989) Assumption L.
2Fringe benefits, provided by the firm to all employed workers, may include such things as medical
insurance, life insurance, some types of paid vacations and pension fund contributions. We use the cash
equivalent of fringe benefits in order to focus on their salient feature in explaining layoÆs, i.e., that these
are costs to the firm which do not depend on the hours a person works, but only depend on the person’s
employment status. Usually, fringe benefits are state-independent as well, and our choice of notation reflects
this. However, our results and arguments are unchanged if we allow fringes to be state-dependent and write
cx.
Severance payments, bx, can be interpreted to include unemployment insurance taxes paid by firms and
received by workers as unemployment benefits, as long as the tax rate is “perfectly experience rated.” We
thus rule out any layoÆ subsidy due to imperfect experience rating. On the role of imperfect experience
rating, see Burdett and Wright (1989) and Feldstein (1976).
3Workers are assumed to have identical increasing and strictly concave utility functions
over income and leisure. Setting total time per period equal to unity, we write utility in
terms of income and hours worked, U(Y, 1 ° hx). The expected utility of a representative
worker in state x, facing the contract specifying {Lx, hx, wx, bx, c}, will be
v(x) ¥ Lx · U (wxhx + c, 1° hx) + (1° Lx) · U (bx, 1) . (2)
Firms compete for workers by oÆering implicit labor contracts that provide competing
levels of expected utility to their workers. Each firm f seeks to maximize the expectation
of some increasing function, √f (·), of state dependent profits. We thus impose neither risk
neutrality nor risk aversion on the part of firms, nor do we require that the functions √f (·)
be identical across firms.
The equilibrium contract oÆered by any individual firm must maximize the expectation,
Z +1
°1
√f (º(x))dF (x), (3)
subject to a constraint of the form,
Z +1
°1
v(x)dF (x) = v§. (4)
Here, v§ can be interpreted as a “reservation” level of expected utility which makes the
marginal worker indiÆerent between joining the firm’s labor pool and accepting some next
best alternative.
In the following theorem, we show that the equilibrium contract will never call for layoÆs,
regardless of the level of fringe benefits paid to workers. Instead, the firm will always employ
its entire labor pool.
Theorem 1 Regardless of the level of fringe benefits, c, the equilibrium contract must
specify Lx = 1 for all x.
We adapt an argument used by Burdett and Wright (1989, p. 1488) to show that,
regardless of the level of fringe benefits, any contract calling for layoÆs in some state can be
improved upon by a diÆerent contract that instead calls for worksharing in that state.
4Proof: Suppose a contract specifies {Lz, hz, wz, bz, c}, where Lz < 1, so that layoÆs are
called for in state z. First note that any other contract that precludes layoÆs in z by
specifying L0z = 1 and h
0




z = hzLz. If, in
addition, the wage is reset to w0z = wz + (1° Lz)(bz ° c)/hzLz, the terms {L0z, h0z, w0z, bz, c}
will give the same level of firm profits in state z as the contract calling for {Lz, hz, wz, bz, c}.
This is easy to verify by forming (1) in the two cases. However, the contract calling for
{L0z, h0z, w0z, bz, c} must provide a higher expected utility in state z than the one which calls
for {Lz, hz, wz, bz, c}. To see this, compare (2) under the two alternatives. Substituting and
rearranging, then invoking Jensen’s inequality, we have:
U (w0zh
0
z + c, 1° h0z) = U (Lz · (wzhz + c) + (1° Lz) · bz , Lz · (1° hz) + (1° Lz) · 1)
> Lz · U (wzhz + c, 1° hz) + (1° Lz) · U (bz, 1) , (P.1)
so workers would be strictly better oÆ with the terms {L0z, h0z, w0z, bz, c}.





z + c, 1° h0z) = Lz · U (wzhz + c, 1° hz) + (1° Lz) · U (bz, 1) ,
because utility is increasing in income. But then any contract calling for {L0z, h0z, w§z , bz, c}
must give workers the same level of expected utility in state z, produce the same firm
output in z, and give strictly greater firm profits in z compared to the contract calling for
{Lz, hz, wz, bz, c}. From this we conclude that no contract which calls for layoÆs in any
state can maximize (3) subject to (4), and thus the equilibrium contract must call for full
employment in every state.
III. Conclusion
The intuition for the preceding theorem is simple enough. In any state of the world,
when output depends only on total labor hours, the firm is indiÆerent between oÆering the
worker a gamble over income and leisure and guaranteeing the worker the expected value of
that gamble. Its revenue and costs will be the same in either case. However, with strictly
convex preferences, workers will always prefer the expected value of any gamble in income
5and leisure to the gamble itself. There is thus a gain to be realized by preventing layoÆs in
implicit labor contracts. How this gain is distributed between the firm and its workers will
depend on the competitive structure of product and labor markets.
The view that fringe benefits cause layoÆs can only be supported in a world where the
firm’s ex post behavior is unrestricted by an implicit contract with workers. Only then can
the firm take advantage of the asymmetrical cost savings that come with layoÆs. When
the labor market is characterized by forward-looking implicit contracts, such ex post firm
behavior will be ruled out in equilibrium.
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